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THE GRACE WE ARE OWED: 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIVINE DUTIES
James B. Gould
Traditional views of grace assert that God owes us nothing. Grace is unde­
served, supererogatory and free. In this paper I argue that while this is an 
accurate characterization of creating grace, it is not true of saving grace. We 
have no right to be created as spiritual beings whose true good is found in 
relationship with God. But once we exist as spiritual beings, God does owe 
us a genuine offer of the salvation that constitutes our highest fulfillment. 
Creating grace is undeserved. Saving grace is deserved (being based on our 
inherent worth and vital interests as spiritual beings) but unearned (it is not 
based on anything we have done).
Two naive teen boys are treading water far from shore in an isolated lake. 
It's their own fault that they are in peril. They deliberately chose to disobey 
their dad's order not to canoe when a storm advisory was in effect. And 
foolishly, they took no life jackets with them. When the wind and waves 
kicked up, their canoe capsized. After searching the cabin, dad spies them 
far out in the lake-exhausted and near drowning. He knows that they 
cannot save themselves and that he is their only hope for rescue. The mis­
sion, however, will be dangerous and co stly -it will risk his life and his 
boat will require extensive repair. But given the seriousness of their need, 
dad owes the boys at least an attempt at rescue. It would be wrong for 
him to just let them perish. He has a duty to try to save them and they 
have a right to be helped. Attempted rescue is not a benevolent gift but is 
something due to them.
According to Christian theology the situation in which human beings 
find themselves vis-a-vis God is similar to the boys' predicament. We were 
made for relationship with God, but by free choice we broke the relation­
ship and are now alienated from God. We cannot return to God by our 
own efforts; our only hope is in divine rescue. Salvation-the restoration 
of friendship with G o d -is  accomplished through the atonement of Jesus 
Christ and is applied by grace given to individuals.1 Traditional views of 
grace assert that
(TG) grace is undeserved, supererogatory and free. God owes us noth­
ing and we have no right to even be offered redemption. Making 
salvation available is not required or obligatory on God; thus God 
can justly offer salvation to and withhold salvation from whom­
ever God chooses.
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In this paper I reject TG and in its place develop and defend a revised 
view of saving grace:
(RG) an offer of saving grace is deserved, obligatory and must be dis­
tributed equally. God does not owe us creating grace, but once 
we exist God does owe us an offer of saving grace. Being offered 
salvation is a human right and offering it a divine duty.
RG rests on a distinction between creating grace and saving grace:
(CG) the action of God that brings us into existence as spiritual beings 
meant for unionwith God;
(SG) the action of God that repairs our separation from God and brings 
us into actual union with God.
Because I assume a strongly libertarian account of freedom, I leave open 
the question of whether God must actually save everyone (or even any­
one, for that matter). But I do argue that God is at least obliged to offer 
SG to all—and to do what God can by way of persuading us to accept 
the offer. Like attempted rescue of the boys, an offer of saving grace is 
not simply a benevolent gift but is something due to human persons as 
a matter of obligation, something to which we have a right. While God 
has no a priori obligation to create, God does have an a posteriori obliga­
tion to make salvation available. Our moral status, as spiritual beings 
with inherent worth and interests which can be harmed or benefited, 
entitles us to be offered salvation and requires God to offer it. This duty 
comes from God's voluntary decision to create spiritual beings who need 
relationship with God. Despite being owed, salvation is nonetheless an 
unearned gift.
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I. Human Rights and Hume's Flawed Claim
David Hume lays out several circumstances—abundant resources, effec­
tive concern for others and complete solitude—in which justice has no 
point. Among the conditions that make claims of justice irrelevant, he 
says, is unequal power. While the powerful may choose to treat the weak 
with gentleness and compassion, they do not owe them duties of justice. 
He offers this thought experiment:
Were there a species of creatures, intermingled with men, which, 
though rational, were possessed of such inferior strength . . . that 
they were incapable of all resistance . . . the necessary consequence,
I think, is, that we should be bound, by the laws of humanity, to 
give gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly speak­
ing, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them, nor could 
they possess any right . . . of such arbitrary lords. Our intercourse 
with them could not be called society, which supposes a degree of 
equality; but absolute command on the one side, and servile obedi­
ence on the other. Whatever we covet, they must instantly resign: our 
permission is the only tenure by which they hold their possessions: 
our compassion and kindness the only check by which they curb our
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lawless will: and . . . the restraints of justice . . . being totally useless,
would have no place is so unequal a confederacy.2
Hume gives three real-life examples—the power of human beings over 
animals, the "superiority of civilized Europeans above barbarous Indi­
ans" and the domination of men over women in many cultures. In each 
case, he says, the powerful have no obligation of justice to the weak. While 
they may choose to be kind to them, the weak, because they are not equal 
to the strong, have no right to be treated well. Humane behavior toward 
them is based on compassion and mercy, not justice.
Hume's claim that the powerful owe nothing to the weak as a matter of 
justice is badly mistaken. We cannot infer 'A has no right to just treatment 
from B' from the fact that 'A is weaker than or inferior to B.' In addition 
to being logically flawed, Hume's claim has implausible implications. If it 
were the case that the weak have no rights against the powerful, then the 
drowning teens would have no right to attempted rescued. Children, the 
sick, the disabled, the mentally handicapped and the elderly would not be 
entitled to humane treatment from healthy adults. Thus Hume is wrong 
in thinking that justice depends on equal power and that the weak have 
no rights.
In fact, Hume has it exactly backwards, since it is precisely in situations 
of unequal power that justice—understood as respect for rights—is neces­
sary. Without rights, the weak and vulnerable are at the mercy of the pow­
erful. Rights safeguard the powerless, protecting their basic interests from 
serious harm by forcing the powerful to observe moral constraints. Rights, 
moreover, are more than privileges or favors that depend on sympathy 
and that may be given or withheld at will. There are two distinct kinds of 
moral transactions. Supererogatory benevolent actions, while admirable 
and praiseworthy to do, are optional and not required as a matter of right. 
Just actions, however, are called for by rights which impose duties. It is 
wrong not to do what is obligatory, and if a person fails to perform a moral 
duty then they are subject to blame and criticism.
Rights express a fundamental principle of morality—respect for per­
sons. There are, Stephen Darwall points out, two types of respect.3 Earned 
respect values people because of their acquired traits and achievements. It 
is not owed to everyone, comes in degrees and is gained and lost by one's 
actions. Basic respect, by contrast, honors the inherent worth and dignity 
of a person simply as a human being. It is not earned or forfeited by a per­
son's actions, is owed to everyone, and is not a matter of degree. Basic hu­
man rights are grounded in our inherent worth. Rights are also grounded 
in interests. To have an interest is to have a stake in something and to gain 
or lose depending on the condition of that thing. Certain interests (such as 
avoiding death or severe and constant pain) are central to a person's well­
being and the individual flourishes or languishes as those interests are 
advanced or set back. Any entity with interests has a well-being that can 
be harmed or benefited and rights which protect that well-being. People 
with rights must not be treated simply as instruments for advancing our 
own personal interests. Instead, we must treat them as ends by paying 
attention to their needs, promoting their welfare and helping them reach 
their true good.
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Thus—contra Hume—the weak are owed something by the powerful. 
Justice and rights depend on intrinsic worth and on having important in­
terests, not—as Hume thought—on equal power.
II. Free Grace: The Theological Equivalent o f Hume's Claim
TG is the theological equivalent of Hume's claim. Consider a recent state­
ment by John Frame: "the very idea of grace is that God is not required 
to give it. If God is required . . . to give grace to us, then we have a certain 
claim on him. But grace excludes such claims. Here redemption is paral­
lel to creation . . . . In neither case do we have any claim upon God."4 Or 
hear Paul Jensen: "is it the case that I do not deserve salvation? Unless it 
is then I am not saved by grace. . . . [H]uman ill-desert requires salvation 
to be the product of divine supererogatory goodness. But the very notion 
of supererogatory goodness, i.e., good acts which God can justly leave un­
done, makes the claim that God is required to perform them incoherent. 
Thus, if humans are ill-deserving of divine salvation, then God can justly 
not save them."5
According to TG, human beings stand in the same relationship to God 
as do the animals, natives and women to European men of Hume's exam­
ples. God owes us nothing as a matter of justice; we deserve nothing and 
have no right to demand anything from God. In particular, God has no 
duty to make salvation available to us and we have no right to be offered 
SG. An offer of salvation is a gratuity which may be given or withheld by 
God at will.
Scripture and tradition teach that salvation is by grace alone. We are 
alienated from God and cannot gain God's favor by our own efforts. Grace 
is the supernatural assistance required for reconciliation with God. TG 
is found across the theological spectrum, not just in narrow strands of 
predestinarianism.6 TG is characterized by three points. First, grace is un­
deserved. It is a form of benevolence that is the opposite of justice. To say 
that salvation is undeserved means that it is not based on anything in hu­
man beings. As John Calvin says, it is a result of God's "freely given mercy, 
without regard to human worth."7 Second, grace is supererogatory. Offering 
salvation is something which it is good of God to do, but not something 
which God must do and to which human beings are entitled. Calvin states 
that "salvation comes about solely from God's mere generosity." Because 
God "can owe none," if we are offered salvation, it is by God's voluntary 
choice rather than obligatory duty.8 Third, grace is free. Because salvation 
is not a right but a gift, God can—in perfect fairness—give grace to some 
and refuse it to others. God is absolutely sovereign, Calvin says, and has 
no moral obligations: "he has not been bound by any laws but is free; so 
that equal apportionment of grace is not to be required of him."9 God has 
the sovereign right to save and to damn whomever God wants: "the fact 
that God . . . chooses one man but rejects another arises . . . solely from 
his mercy, which ought to be free to manifest and express itself where and 
when he pleases."10
TG parallels Hume's claim. According to Marilyn Adams, "nothing 
(certainly not creatures' rights) bind God as to what soteriological scheme 
(if any) he establishes." Indeed, "God is so far above, so different in kind
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from us, as not to be enmeshed in merely human networks of mutual 
rights and obligations; God is not the kind of thing that could be obligated 
to creatures in any way. . . . God will not be unjust to created persons no 
matter what he does."11 God owes us nothing. God may offer salvation as 
an act of benevolence, but it is not a divine duty or a human right.
III. The Flaws in Free Grace: What God Must Do, and Why
TG is mistaken in the same way that Hume's claim is mistaken. Before ex­
plaining why God owes us something, let me briefly say what I think God 
owes us. God owes us equally a genuine, continuous offer of salvation and 
maximal assistance to freely accept the offer. We must be given a genuine 
chance to be saved. God cannot demand the impossible by setting certain 
standards for salvation, such as explicit belief in the gospel, and then only 
giving some people the opportunity to meet those standards. The offer 
must be continuous. It cannot be withdrawn at death and must stand even 
after repeated rejection. In addition to a genuine, continuous offer of sal­
vation, God must provide help to respond to the offer. God does not owe 
us efficacious grace, grace that actually saves by causing us to repent and 
believe. But God does owe us sufficient grace, grace that—by enlightening 
our minds and freeing our wills—makes us fully able to respond to the 
offer of salvation. Actual salvation requires our cooperation, and God's 
assistance must leave us free to accept or reject God's love. Since suffi­
cient grace comes in degrees, God owes us maximal rather than minimal 
help. God must do all God can, short of compelling us and destroying our 
freedom, to empower, prompt and urge us to believe.12 Finally, this offer 
and assistance must be provided equally to all persons. The term 'offer of 
salvation,' then, does not mean merely providing opportunity; it means, 
as well, encouragement and persuasion to accept the offer. God owes us 
equal and optimal—but not efficacious—grace.
Many theists reject the idea that God can have obligations. Without 
entering that complicated debate, let me simply say that both scripture 
and reason—as this paper argues—suggest that God has obligations. 
The biblical witness contains many divine promises in which God freely 
binds Godself to humanity. Consider, for example, the major redemptive 
covenants—the promise to Abraham, the giving of the law at Sinai, and 
the restatement of the promise to David. It is true that God has no pre­
creation, involuntary obligations. But God does have post-creation, vol­
untary ones. I had no marital obligations until I pledged my faithful love 
to my wife Jenna. My promise created my obligation. In the same way, 
God—for example—has no before-the-promise duty to help Moses lead 
the Israelites out of Egypt. But having made that promise, God does have 
an after-the-fact duty.
And now my argument. I take my starting point from Frame's assertion 
that "redemption is parallel to creation. . . . In neither case do we have any 
claim upon God." Daniel Strange agrees: "God's decrees of creation and 
redemption are not necessary. . . . God's freedom to create or not create 
can also apply to redemption."13 This, I contend, is false. Redemption and 
creation are not symmetrical. While we have no right to be created, once 
we exist we do have a right to be offered salvation. Why?
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The argument against TG (and for RG) is as follows:14
1. If God makes spiritual beings, then God must take steps to fulfill 
their spiritual desires.
2. God has made all human persons as spiritual beings.
3. Therefore, God must take steps to fulfill their spiritual desires.
This modus ponens syllogism is valid, so the only question is whether its 
premises are true. I believe they are.
Premise 2: God has made all human persons as spiritual beings.
By 'spiritual being' I mean a creature who is oriented to God and who 
finds its supreme end and deepest fulfillment in union with God. Unlike 
rocks, petunias and lizards, we are in our very nature created for rela­
tionship with God. St. Augustine makes this point is his famous prayer: 
"You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless until 
they rest in you."15 Karl Rahner observes that all persons have an immedi­
ate, pre-conceptual awareness of a transcendent reality. God "stamps . . . 
man's nature" with "a character which we may call a 'supernatural exis- 
tential'"—that is, "a tendency towards God, which is on occasion quite 
implicit and incoherent and yet always completely permeates man's being 
and existence."16 This natural desire for God is the gracious gift of God 
(and hence 'supernatural'), yet is a basic, essential characteristic (or 'exis­
tential') of human nature. The sensus divinitatis is not restricted to a rare 
few, but is universal. All human persons are spiritual beings who long, 
often unconsciously, for intimacy with the God for whom they are meant 
and in whose love they find their summum bonum. Human behavior, both 
holy and sinful, is motivated by a deep spiritual hunger. Human nature 
is permeated with spiritual longings and our highest good is found in 
friendship with God. This is what it means to be a spiritual being.
Premise 1: I f God freely chooses to make spiritual beings, then God must take 
steps to fulfill their spiritual desires.
Take the antecedent. It was God's free and gratuitous choice to make spiri­
tual beings. God did not have to create at all, and God did not owe it to us 
to make us as spiritual beings, nor—per impossible—did we somehow earn 
that right by any action on our part. Prior to creation we had no claims 
on God. That we are made for relationship with God is an undeserved 
benevolent gift.
God created us for and with the desire to experience communion 
with God. Therein lies God's free choice. But this free choice has a con- 
sequence—it creates divine duties and human rights. Once God makes 
spiritual beings whose summum bonum can be fulfilled or frustrated, then 
God has a duty to offer and we have a right to be offered relationship with 
God. To make us as spiritual beings meant for intimate personal union 
with God and then withhold from us any possibility of the salvation that 
will fulfill our spiritual yearnings would be unjust. It would, moreover, 
contradict God's intent in creating spiritual beings in the first place. Hu­
man parents must—morally and rationally—love and provide for any
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child they choose to beget. As Timothy Jackson states the moral principle: 
"if one has induced the needs and potentials of another by bringing him 
into existence as a dependent, then one owes it to that other, as a matter 
of duty, to meet his needs and to cultivate his potentials."17 The decision 
of a loving parent to have a child is simultaneously a decision to seek that 
child's flourishing. In the same way, having created us to find our deep­
est fulfillment in relationship with God, God must do what God can to 
fulfill this desire (by offering salvation and assisting us to believe). While 
God need not provide efficacious grace that actually fulfills our spiritual 
desires, God must give us optimal opportunity to be saved.
So, contra Frame and Strange, creation and redemption are not identi­
cal. TG fails to recognize the "revolutionary character" of God's decision 
to create spiritual beings.18 The question 'does God owe us something?' 
means at least two things—'before we are created, does God owe us exis­
tence?' and 'once we are created, does God owe us an opportunity for sal­
vation?' The answer to the first is no; creation is an act of free, undeserved 
grace. But the answer to the second is yes; once we exist, we do deserve 
a chance to receive what is essential for our well-being. Since friendship 
with God is our true good, an offer of salvation is required. In matters 
of creation we have no claim on God; in matters of redemption, we do. 
The ethics of CG (which is based on supererogatory benevolence) and SG 
(which is about justice, duties and rights) are not the same.
Let me now develop in more detail some reasons for thinking that TG 
is false, that in creating us as spiritual beings God assumes the duty to 
make SG available to everyone. First, as spiritual beings we have the right to 
be offered a chance to avoid serious harm  and the horrendous suffering o f  hell. To 
be harmed is to have one's interests set back. Certain interests are central 
to our well-being, and when they are blocked we experience serious harm. 
Rights protect us from harms such as severe suffering.
Consider non-human animals. While Hume believed that we should 
be kind to them, he did not think of animals as having rights to humane 
treatment. We owe nothing to them as their due. Hume is mistaken about 
this. The capacity to feel pain is a sufficient ground for ascribing interests, 
and hence rights, to animals. Some entities have no interests in this sense. 
A clay pot is not conscious and thus has no goals, desires or experiences. 
Because it has no good of its own and cannot be benefited or harmed, it 
has no rights. But animals are conscious. As creatures capable of suffering, 
animals have the right not to have needless pain inflicted on them. Thus 
we owe something to animals as their due.
This argument applies mutatis m utandis to God and human beings. St. 
Paul is often cited to defend the claim that God owes us nothing. Just 
as a clay pot has no right to be treated well by the potter, so human be­
ings have no right to be treated well by God (Rom 9:20-21).19 Understood 
this way, the analogy is faulty. If I make a clay pot, I may destroy it if I 
like—there are no moral constraints on my action toward it. But if I make 
a child, I may not treat it in any way I choose. And since children are 
conscious persons with interests, not harming my child is obligatory—not 
an optional benevolence. Moral duties are inherent in creating sentient 
beings—and in creating spiritual beings. Because we can suffer spiritual 
deprivation—the loss of our true good, the enjoyment of God's love and
presence—God owes us a chance to escape this misery as a matter of right, 
not as a privilege or favor.
The right to avoid serious harm includes the right to not suffer inescap­
able horrendous evils. Adams defines evil as horrendous if experiencing 
that evil means that a person's life cannot be good on the whole, if within 
that person's life good is engulfed or defeated by evil.20 As an analogy, 
consider so-called 'wrongful lives' in which a child's non-existence is pref­
erable to a severely disabled life with terrible burdens and without com­
pensating benefits. Children have a right not to be conceived unless their 
most basic interests are protected. This right limits parents' reproductive 
liberty. They must not let their child suffer a serious harm that they could 
have reasonably prevented. Parents owe their children something.
Hell—where any temporal happiness enjoyed on earth is wiped out 
by eternal suffering—is an instance of horrendous evil. Because we have 
been created for relationship with God and find there our highest good, 
salvation is essential for a person's well-being. To be denied the possibil­
ity of union with God would be find ourselves condemned to permanent 
frustration since our supreme end—an end necessary for our ultimate 
fulfillment—will never be satisfied. Jesus himself acknowledged that it 
would be better not to exist than to sin and be damned (Mt 26:24; Lk 17:2). 
God must not create a person to whom salvation from the misery of hell is 
not offered and who thus suffers unavoidable horrendous evil.
Second, as spiritual beings we have the right to help in meeting our basic 
need for salvation. From the right to avoid harm we can derive a duty to be 
helped when in serious trouble. A need is an essential condition for hu­
man welfare, and when a need is unmet a person suffers significant harm. 
Positive rights to assistance protect us from harms that result when we 
cannot meet our own basic needs. It is often thought that not harming oth­
ers is a duty while doing good to others is supererogatory. This is not true; 
there are some duties of benevolence. The boys have a right to attempted 
rescue simply because they can't save themselves and will otherwise die. 
And dad has a duty to try to rescue them. While some assistance is gener­
ous and goes beyond the call of duty, some assistance is required.
As spiritual beings salvation is our most basic need. Just as the boys' 
most important interest is at risk, so sinners stand to lose the true good of 
knowing and enjoying God forever. Given the tremendous harm that hell 
represents, God must reach out in help by offering and encouraging us to 
receive salvation.
Finally, as equal beings we have the right to be offered salvation equally. These 
rights—to avoid horrendous suffering and to be offered needed help—apply 
to all people. Fairness requires treating each person's interests and welfare 
as equally important as everyone else's. This is simply a matter of rational 
consistency. It is coherent to treat people differently only if there is some 
relevant difference between them. If both boys are in the same situation and 
if dad can rescue both, then it would be wrong for him to rescue one but let 
the other drown for no reason except his sheer wish.
The same applies to God. Since all human persons are spiritual beings 
with an equal capacity to suffer the pain of damnation, God must treat 
all alike by offering salvation to everyone without exception. Because each 
person's soteriological interests count and count as much as those of anyone
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else, it would be wrong for God to make salvation available to som e-say 
to those born in the Christian west in the last two m illennia-but not oth­
ers. If salvation is offered to all without distinction, then either it cannot 
require explicit belief in the gospel (but can be found through implicit faith 
as shown in sincere moral action and religious devotion) or all who do not 
hear of Christ in this life must be evangelized after death. God must give all 
an equal opportunity to be saved, not as a matter of courtesy and compas­
sion but as a matter of justice and duty.
Finally, notice that premise 1 is unconditional. It contradicts Augustine's 
claim that, by deliberately choosing sin, we forfeit all right to salvation. 
First, it is not obvious that we deliberately choose sin.21 We were created 
to enjoy God's presence. Sin breaks our relationship with God and discon­
nects us from our true good-leaving us, as spiritual beings, incomplete 
and restless. We typically sin from ignorance rather than evil intent. We 
do wrong because we misjudge it to be g o o d -a  way of meeting our hopes 
and fears, of creating happy and meaningful lives. As G. K. Chesterton sug­
gested, "the man at the brothel door is looking for God."22 Sinful behavior 
is motivated by a deep, unconscious spiritual hunger. But even if most 
wrongdoing was deliberate, defiant rebellion against God's authority, that 
would not disqualify us from the right to be offered salvation. Why not? 
Because salvation is necessary for our ultimate welfare as spiritual beings. 
The boys retain their right to attempted rescue and dad is duty-bound to 
assist even if, just before the storm, they told him off, cursing and mistreat­
ing him. Our right to be offered salvation is absolute and inalienable, one 
that we possess unconditionally. This unforfeitable right is based on our 
w o rth -a  moral status that cannot be lost by bad behavior.
I conclude that premise 1 is true. Having made spiritual beings for 
union with God, God must seek the fulfillment of our highest good by 
offering us salvation. TG is flawed because it ignores the human rights 
and divine duties that come with creating spiritual beings. A God who 
operated by TG would condemn some persons to suffer horrendous evil, 
ignore their need for spiritual assistance, and play favorites. TG fails to 
distinguish SG (which is deserved by and owed to all equally) from CG 
(which is undeserved, supererogatory and free). TG has a faulty view of 
SG because first, SG  is n o t  undeserved . While creation is undeserved, an of­
fer of salvation is deserved because of intrinsic human worth and the basic 
human rights which protect our most fundamental interests. Second, SG  
is n o t  supererogatory . Creation is an optional choice. God is free to create 
or not create spiritual beings, but offering salvation to all created spiritual 
beings is obligatory for God. Third, SG is n o t  free. Access to salvation must 
be distributed equally to all spiritual beings; it cannot be offered to some 
and withheld from others. Thus, while God does not owe us CG, God 
must offer us SG.
IV  Objections Considered
I now briefly consider two objections to the God-owes-us-something view. 
First, on RG what happens to grace? Do moral demands on God destroy 
salvation by grace? Second, on RG what happens to divine sovereignty? 
Do moral demands destroy God's right to do as God pleases?
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W hat about Salvation by Grace?
Scripture clearly affirms that salvation is by grace. And yet if God owes 
us an opportunity to be saved as a matter of justice, then in what sense is 
salvation by grace? Romans 3:24 says that we are "justified by . . . grace 
as a gift" and Romans 6:23 claims that salvation is "the free gift of God." 
Romans 11:6 teaches that "if salvation is by grace, it is no longer on the 
basis of works." Ephesians 2:8-9 states that "by grace you have been saved 
through faith, and this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God, not the 
result of works." The Greek word 5rapov (doron—used in Eph 2:8) means 
a gift received undeservedly and without payment, and the word xap iG  
(charis—u s e d  in Rom 6:23) means something given freely, graciously, as 
a favor done out of good will.23 In these verses St. Paul contrasts salva­
tion as divine gift with salvation achieved by human effort. A gift is, by 
definition, something that is not bought or given because the recipient did 
something to gain credit. Salvation is not earned by what we do, by good 
works and obedience to the moral law. We simply receive God's gift, a gift 
provided for by Christ's sacrifice, through faith.
The term 'deserve' can be used in two ways that correspond to the dis­
tinction between earned respect and basic respect.24 In one sense, to de­
serve means to merit or to earn (as in 'she deserves to win the gold medal 
because of her brilliant skating'). M erit-desert (or m-desert) is based on hu­
man action, on what we do. In another sense, however, to deserve means 
to be worthy of (as in 'she deserves not to be mistreated by her husband'). 
W orth-desert (or w-desert) is based on human constitution, on what we 
are. Once this equivocation is recognized, it is clear that the boys do not 
m-deserve but do w-deserve attempted rescue. They are worthy of—and 
owed—the offer even though they have done nothing to earn it. Merit is 
not the only way in which we become entitled to something.
To say that salvation is by grace simply means that it is unearned—not 
that it is undeserved . This is why St. Paul consistently contrasts grace with 
works, gift salvation with earned salvation. There is nothing we can do to 
merit God's friendship; forgiveness is given to us only through the merit 
of Christ. But even though human beings do not m-deserve the opportu­
nity to be saved, we do w-deserve it. Thus Jensen is mistaken in thinking 
that "humans are ill-deserving  of divine salvation." Because we are spiri­
tual beings with inherent worth and vital spiritual interests, we are—in 
fact—w ell-deserving  of being offered SG. This is also why Calvin is mis­
taken in thinking that grace is given "without regard to human w orth ." 
While grace is given without regard to human m erit, it is offered precisely 
because of human worth. Once we distinguish the two senses of 'deserve,' 
we can see that what is essential to the notion of grace is not that it is unde­
served, but that it is unearned. It is because TG confuses merit and worth 
that some mistakenly see SG as undeserved and conclude that God owes 
us nothing.25 The fact that an offer of salvation is owed does not destroy 
salvation by grace.
Nor does RG destroy human gratitude to God. We might think that 
when a duty is done, there is no place for thanks. This seems true when 
negative duties not to harm are at issue. The boys do not owe gratitude 
if dad refrains from hitting them with an oar and drowning them. But
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gratitude is appropriate when the duties in question are positive duties 
to help. This is true even when, as in the boys' case, the benefits are owed 
and the benefactor is fulfilling a duty. Gratitude shows that we are glad for 
the good we have received, that we appreciate what was done for us and 
that we recognize and regret the cost to the giver. And so the redeemed re­
spond with thanks to God for the salvation which they have been given.
W hat about D ivine Sovereignty?
As we have seen, TG protects maximal divine sovereignty. To say that 
God is bound to obey external rules would set up over God something 
that constrains God. But RG does not put God under involuntary obli­
gation. I was not under parental duty until I freely place myself there 
by having my daughters Becky and Sarah and adopting my son David. 
In the same way, only after creation are there human rights and divine 
duties. By choosing to create spiritual beings, God puts Godself under 
moral obligation to them and voluntarily surrenders the complete free­
dom to treat them in any way God chooses. Consider an analogy. The 
choice to create beings with libertarian free will puts God under meta­
physical constraint. There are some things that God cannot do if God 
wishes to respect human freedom. In the same way, God's choice to create 
spiritual beings puts God under moral constraint. There are some things 
that God cannot do once God creates persons with spiritual needs. These 
limits, however, are not externally imposed on God but are self-chosen. 
Creating spiritual beings was God's critical free choice. God did not have 
to create persons, but when God did so God simultaneously chose to 
impose moral limits on Godself. Because of something G od  has done, we 
now have a claim on God. The fact that an offer of salvation is owed does 
not destroy divine sovereignty.
This objection is part of a broader worry that RG is human-centered 
and "is an attempt to subvert God into humankind's servant." "[I]t is im­
portant," Strange asserts, "that we safeguard God's self-sufficiency and 
independence from creation" and human beings.26 In reply, the biblical 
record of salvation history portrays a God who is eager to know and love 
all human persons, a God who seeks relationship with us, not indepen­
dence from us, a God who—as Dietrich Bonhoeffer puts it—does not wish 
to be "free o f  man but fo r  man."27 This objection also ignores the fact that 
RG begins with an act of God's free gratuitous grace—creation of spiritual 
beings. This choice, however, has moral consequences for both them and 
God. Once spiritual beings exist, God becomes self-obligated to offer sal­
vation to everyone. Both TG and RG are God-centered, but where TG is 
God-centered in both creation and  redemption, RG limits God's absolute 
sovereignty to the moment of creation. Because God initiates and pursues 
relationship with us, RG does not turn God into our servant.
V. Concluding Thoughts
God, as a totally free gift, created us as spiritual beings meant for intimate 
personal union with God. But we are unable to establish friendship with 
God by our own efforts without assisting grace. God must act to help us
reach our true good. God does not owe us existence—but God does owe 
us an offer of salvation.
We have been concerned with what God must do, and why. So what has 
God actually done? Scripture affirms that God loves the whole world and 
desires the salvation of all (1 Tm 2:4; 2 Pt 3:9). From this we can logically 
infer universal access to salvation. If God desires something (that everyone 
be saved) then God acts to bring it about (by drawing all people toward 
friendship with God). Scripture affirms "the utmost patience" (1 Tm 1:16) 
and endlessly-seeking love of God, portraying God as a shepherd desper­
ately searching for one lost sheep until he finds it, as a woman turning her 
home upside down until she retrieves a missing coin, as a heartsick father 
anxiously awaiting the return of a wandering son (Lk 15). This, of course, 
does not resolve the question of who is actually saved. According to sepa­
ratists, human freedom means that people may become so entrenched in 
willfulness and pride that they forever refuse God's offer of salvation and 
are thus eternally damned. Universalists are more optimistic, believing 
in God's resourceful ability to bring all into God's kingdom. They ques­
tion the assumptions that human beings can freely choose to forever reject 
God and that human freedom is the greatest good. I leave unanswered the 
question of who is actually saved. While not a convinced universalist (who 
thinks that universalism can be dogmatically defended), I am a hopeful 
universalist (who finds support for universalism in scripture, theological 
reflection and philosophical reasoning).28
Does God owe us something? The answer, I have argued, is yes. Does 
this mean, then, that a duty-and-rights model is the best way in which to 
think of the divine-human relationship? The answer, I think, is no.29
From the human side rights-talk distorts our relationship with God. 
Rights play an important role in impersonal contexts by governing inter­
actions between strangers who do not care about each other and whose in­
terests may conflict. When there is indifference or ill-will between people 
and when others may be a threat, then rights are a necessary protection 
for what is due someone. If dad ignored the boys' pleas for help, refusing 
to rescue them because he can't be bothered, then they could insist that he 
do so. But if dad is considerate and kind, then he will automatically come 
to their aid without being asked. When relationships are characterized by 
caring, rights are not necessary to ensure that we get our due. The fact that 
the boys may not exercise their rights, however, does not mean that those 
rights do not exist. Because God has our best interest in mind by willing 
all human beings to enjoy their chief end, we can trust God and need not 
demand our rights. Rights-talk, then, does not properly characterize our 
relationship with God.
The same is true from the divine side. Duty-talk distorts God's rela­
tionship to us. Dad, if he is a good man, will not experience the duty to 
rescue his sons as an externally-imposed requirement. When we experi­
ence duties as demands that come down on us from outside, it is because 
these duties are not connected to our natural concerns and because we 
see the other person's interests as limitations on our freedom. Dad will 
feel himself under obligation only if he is not naturally inclined to care 
about his sons. But if he wants to help, then doing so will not feel like 
an unwanted demand. In caring relationships the other person's concerns
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are not an imposition that constrains us, but interests that we naturally 
wish to promote. In the same way God, while under moral obligation to 
human beings, does not experience these demands as alien requirements 
forcing God to do things which God would rather not do. Instead, because 
God's nature is love, concern for human well-being is deep in the structure 
of God's natural desires and motivations. God offers us salvation gladly 
not grudgingly, out of love rather than obligation. Duty is not the driving 
force behind God's gracious treatment of us.
Human rights and divine duties, while a fact, ultimately misconstrue 
the human-divine relationship. It is important, however, to critique the 
standard God-owes-us-nothing m od el-one that conceptualizes the rela­
tionship between God and humanity in terms of duty and obligation-and 
challenge it on its own terms.
McHenry County College
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